When asked by an Iowa voter whether he was a practicing Catholic, Republican presidential candidate and former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani responded:
My religious affiliation ... and the degree to which I am a good or not so good Catholic, I prefer to leave to the priests. When the voter pressed him to answer the question, Giuliani reiterated:
That's a matter of individual conscience. . . . I don't think there should be a religious test for public office. The religious test for public office language invokes Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, which states: “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”
Because there is little case law interpreting the Religious Test Clause, it is frequently viewed as an
irrelevant or
forgotten part of the Constitution. According to law professor
Paul Horwitz, however, that conclusion is
“quickly belied” by the extensive popular use (230,000 hits on Google!) of the expression “religious test,” especially during the nominations of John Roberts, Harriet Miers and Samuel Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court, when some commentators suggested that questioning nominees about their faith, or voting for or against nominees because of their religious views, violates Article VI.
Horwitz concludes that the popular commentary misread the scope of the Religious Test Clause, which is very narrow:
Thus, although the Constitution requires President Giuliani to take an oath or affirmation to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States,” he cannot be compelled to swear an oath to Jesus or to take communion in the Catholic Church or any other church.
Obviously the Iowa voter was not advocating any legal violations of Article VI. Why, then, would
Giuliani—a talented lawyer who worked in the prestigious Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York and the Justice Department—invoke the constitutional language in a situation where there was no constitutional violation?
Giuliani’s response provides a practical, political application of the constitutional text. The Religious Test Clause, and Giuliani’s answer, simply remind us that the Qualifications for public office are political, not religious. If religious faith qualifies one for public office, then it is appropriate to consider whether the mayor’s pro-choice positions are consistent with Catholic dogma, how often he attends Mass, how many times he has been married (three), whether his first and second marriages were annulled by the Catholic Church, if his third marriage prevents him from receiving communion at his church’s services, and whether Catholic bishops intend to deny him communion because of his support for abortion rights.
Consider these two topics of abortion and divorce, which are frequently raised in connection with Guiliani’s campaign. Religious history professor
Randall Balmer reminds his readers that, in the New Testament, Jesus is
silent on abortion but condemns divorce. Does this mean that a pro-choice, never-divorced candidate (say, Hillary Clinton) is more qualified for the presidency than a divorced and pro-life one (like Ronald Reagan)? Which situation should the voters take more seriously: that some Catholic bishops refused communion to John Kerry for his pro-choice votes, or that Rudy Giuliani’s remarriage after divorce, without annulment, makes him ineligible to receive communion? And so forth.
All those matters are best left to the priests. The priests, however, should not decide who governs—as they would, indirectly, if voters focus on how well a candidate practices Catholicism, Methodism, Mormonism or Judaism. Because the Constitution bars religious tests as qualifications for public office, the voters should follow its logic and spirit, asking the candidate, not if he is a practicing Catholic, but if he is a practicing politician who is faithful to the Constitution.