by Stanley Brand,
a former General Counsel to the U.S. House of Representatives
(1976-1984) who has litigated major cases involving Congress’
constitutional powers
As Congress begins to investigate
allegations concerning the destruction of videotapes of detainee
interrogations by the C.I.A., there are questions that arise concerning
the ability of Congress to engage in effective oversight of executive
branch agencies in the area of national security. The Department of
Justice has already pushed back and asked Congress to stay its
inquiries into the destruction of the tapes, citing potential
interference in the concurrent criminal inquiries initiated by the
Department.
This well known Kabuki dance between Congress and the
Executive branch over the intersection between oversight and criminal
law enforcement has played out hundreds of times since the beginning of
the Republic, in our lifetimes most notably in Watergate and
Iran-Contra. There is an equally insidious way in which these shared
investigative powers collide—and that is in the way in which the
Executive seeks to control and intimidate Congressional oversight by
reliance on the classification system and the veiled, and sometimes
direct, threat of prosecution of members of Congress for disclosing
classified information in the course of performing their oversight
responsibilities.
One such recent episode illustrates the way in
which this threat unduly and illegitimately inhibits the kind of
oversight Congress should be doing in this area. In 2003, Senator Jay
Rockefeller, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Intelligence, felt
compelled to write a handwritten secret letter to the Vice President
expressing his concerns about the Executive’s surveillance program. See Charles E. Schumer: Under Attack: Congressional Power in the Twenty-First Century .
According to media stories at the time, Senator Rockefeller felt
constrained to use this low key fully private approach for fear that a
more robust formal official channel would have been subjected to
charges that he violated strictures on the disclosure of classified
information.
Of course, from a constitutional and legal
prospective, any such fear was unfounded, as established by the
landmark Vietnam era case Gravel v. United States .
On
June 29, 1971 Senator Gravel convened a night-time meeting of the
subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds, which he chaired, and placed the
47 volumes of the Pentagon Papers
(a study of the causes and conduct of the Vietnam war) into the public
record. The Justice Department commenced a grand jury investigation
into possible criminal conduct in the release and publication of the
study by Beacon Press and subpoenaed an aide to the senator. Senator
Gravel intervened on his behalf and asserted that questioning the aide
about his involvement in the committee hearing or the subsequent
publication by Beacon Press contravened the Constitution’s “speech or
debate” clause, which provides immunity to Members of Congress for
their performance of legislative acts. The Court held that neither the
Senator, nor his aide, could be questioned concerning their
preparations for the hearing, communications between the Senator and
aides relating to that meeting or anything said or done at the hearing.
The Court also held that the grand jury could question the arrangements
with Beacon Press concerning private publication of the Pentagon Papers
because efforts to disseminate the study outside of Congress didn’t
constitute protected legislative activity.
The Court protected
the conduct of the hearing, even though the hastily convened night-time
meeting was a none too subtle attempt to shield the dissemination of
classified material, and even though such acts of dissemination, if
performed outside of Congress, would be subject to criminal prosecution.
Under Gravel, Senator
Rockefeller (nor any other member of Congress) need not have been
either so secretive or reticent to use official channels to question
the surveillance program, or for that matter any other subject of
national security. Indeed, he could have officially communicated with
relevant Executive officials, shared that correspondence with his
colleagues on the Committee, or even taken to the Senate floor to speak
about the issue. (Whether such conduct would have been consistent with
Senate and Committee rules governing classified information would be a
matter only for the Senate and could play no part in any Executive
branch examination of his conduct). The "Speech or Debate"
clause protection is based on its English antecedent, the product of
several centuries struggle by Parliament to attain independence from
the Crown. In this country it was adopted without debate at the
constitutional convention to provide the same independence to
legislators to be free from intimidation by the executive, or
accountability before the judiciary.
The Rockefeller episode
illustrates how too often legislators are cowed into acquiescence or
timid supplications with respect to issues involving classified
documents or matters by an aggressive or threatening Executive branch.
Of course, over 30 year ago in a case eerily reminiscent of the current
controversies, the Supreme Court laid to rest the notion that
legislators could be questioned by the Executive branch for doing their
job. Every member of Congress needs to read the Gravel
decision to appreciate the broad constitutional protection they have
been afforded by the Framers to inquire into the Executive’s
administration of our national security apparatus.